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CREATIONISM AND  
INTELLIGENT DESIGN
The debate over how to address the origins of life in American schools has 
been ongoing for almost a century.  Proponents of creationism and intelligent 
design have used several different strategies in order to make sure their 
views are taught, and each time they have been struck down by the Supreme 
Court.  This paper will analyze the three distinct forms the debate has taken, 
from attempts to ban outright the teaching of evolution, to the teaching of 
some form of creation-science alongside evolution, to attempts to “disclaim” 
evolution as it is taught.  In its decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has used 
different tests to decide whether or not the actions of creationist school boards 
and teachers  violates the Establishment Clause.  The Lemon Test and the 
Endorsement Test are analyzed in this paper, and any analysis of religious 
“purpose” is soundly rejected in favour of a thorough analysis of religious 
“effects” as the best method of determining whether a constitutional violation 
has occurred.
BRIAN MacDONALD†
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I. INTRODUCTION: DOVER, PENNSYLVANIA
William Buckingham and Alan Bonsell were both elected to the Dover 
Area School District Board of Directors in Dover, Pennsylvania, in 
March of 2001.  In January of 2002, the Board of Directors had a retreat 
to discuss their agenda, and Bonsell listed “creationism” as his primary 
concern.  The following year, at a second retreat, Bonsell insisted that 
“creationism and evolution” be given equal treatment in biology classes.1  
In 2004, Buckingham refused to approve a biology textbook, stating that 
“it is inexcusable to have a book that says man descended from apes with 
nothing to counter-balance it.”2  Bonsell and Buckinhgam were informed 
by counsel that the counterbalancing approach was unconstitutional, so 
they chose a different but increasingly common route.  All grade nine 
school students were read a disclaimer before being taught about evolution. 
An excerpt of this disclaimer reads:
Because Darwin’s theory is a theory, it continues to be 
tested as new evidence is discovered.  The Theory is not 
a fact.  Gaps in the theory exist for which there is no 
evidence.  A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation 
that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from 
Darwin’s view.3 The disclaimer goes on to refer students to a book called 
Of Pandas and People, a book that calls itself a scientific text on the origins 
of life but is essentially a creationist text,4 though that is by no means a 
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decision of Judge Jones in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District6 are the 
latest flashpoints in the seemingly continuous debate surrounding what 
should be taught to children in the United States about the origins of life.
Understanding the debate requires understanding the positions of the 
parties and the constitutional backdrop.  The parties can be divided (again, 
controversially) into two distinct factions.  The first can be described as 
advocates of evolution and an origin of life that is based on naturalistic and 
non-supernatural causes.  Richard Dawkins wrote in one of his scientific 
works that “today the theory of evolution is about as much open to doubt 
as the theory that the earth goes around the sun.”7 Time magazine agrees, 
noting that “Darwin’s venerable theory is widely regarded as one of the best 
supported ideas in science, the only explanation for the diversity of life on 
Earth, grounded in decades of study and objective evidence.”8  Evolutionary 
scientist Ernst Mayr provides a succinct and accurate definition of the 
theory:
‘evolution is change in the adaptation and in the diversity 
of populations of organisms.’  He notes that evolution 
has a dual nature, a ‘vertical’ phenomenon of adaptive 
change…and a ‘horizontal’ phenomenon of populations, 
incipient species, and new species.9
Technical though this definition is, it is a simplification of the dominant 
scientific theory about the origins of life on earth. 
The second faction can be broadly labeled “creationist,” but advocates of 
“intelligent design” who found themselves embroiled in legal proceedings 
in Dover would resent the implication that their views are creationist 
(though they would have trouble explaining how the term “creationism” 
was simply replaced approximately 150 times with the expression 
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“intelligent design” in early drafts of an intelligent design textbook10), and 
in the interest of fairness these two concepts will be defined separately.  
Creationism, or “creation-science” as it became dubbed in the 1980s, is 
based on the view that “modern science has revealed a vast web of evidence 
which supports the biblical record of creation.”11  This evidence includes 
“gaps in the fossil record,” arguments based on irreducible complexity and 
a rejection of the inheritability of DNA.12  Creation-scientists believe that 
these gaps are evidence of the biblical account of creation.  
Intelligent design cannot be reasonably thought to be anything other 
than a rebranding of creationism, with several concessions made to 
escape constitutional scrutiny.  The widely cited “Wedge Document” is 
the mission statement of a leading intelligent design think tank called the 
Discovery Institute, and it states that the organization:
seek[s] nothing less than the overthrow of materialism and 
its cultural legacies.  Bringing together leading scholars 
from the natural sciences and those from the humanities 
and social sciences, the Center [for the Renewal of Science 
and Culture, a part of the Discovery Institute] explores how 
new developments in biology, physics and cognitive science 
raise serious doubts about scientific materialism and have 
re-opened the case of a broadly theistic understanding of 
nature.13 (emphasis added)
Intelligent design purports to be a scientific theory based on the claim that 
“there are ‘tell-tale features of living systems and the universe that are best 
explained by an intelligent cause.’”14  The scientific proofs for this theory are 
based on the “irreducible complexity” of some aspects of living organisms15 
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and mathematical probabilities.16  They infer from these a “designer,” 
although they perhaps doth protest too much that this “designer” need not 
be supernatural.17
A final definitional note: the categories described above are not air-tight.  
There are no doubt scientists and firm supporters of the evolutionary 
theory who believe in a supernatural deity, just as “faced with the 
overwhelming evidence of evolved life, many modern creationists…
willingly concede that at least some evolution occurs.”18  Throughout this 
paper there will be reference to “two sides” of the debate.  This is simply a 
shorthand reference to those who believe only evolution should be taught 
in science class and those who believe evolution should be combined 
with, replaced by, or disclaimed by some religious, theistic or supernatural 
theory.  It does not imply that every party on each “side” subscribes fully to 
the beliefs described above; it is simply a reference to their legal position.
Finally, the constitutional backdrop of this debate is the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, specifically, the first sentence of the first 
amendment, known as the Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”19  This clause refers to Congress, but under the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to laws made by states and statutory bodies (such as 
school boards) as well.
With the definitions, however controversial, laid out, this paper will 
discuss this debate in the context of the legal battles fought between the 
two camps.  The first section will outline the legal history, beginning in 
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with respect to the creationism debate, including issues around legislative 
purpose and scientific legitimacy.   The final section will address the future 
of the creationism debate in light of the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School 
District decision in Dover.  Ultimately, the paper will demonstrate that 
while the courts’ analyses of legislative purpose are flawed, creationism and 
intelligent design still must demonstrate scientific legitimacy if they are to 
survive constitutional challenges.
II. HISTORY
The history of the debate about teaching evolution can be divided into 
three distinct phases.  The first, from 1925-1968, was the period where 
several states had anti-evolution statutes.  The second period, which ran 
from 1968-1987, saw several states attempt to balance the teaching of 
evolution with requirements that some form of creationism be taught 
alongside it.  The third, from 1988-present, saw attempts to disclaim the 
teaching of evolution, as well as the development of the intelligent design 
movement. 
A. 1925-1968: Anti-evolutionary Phase
On March 23, 1925, the governor of Tennessee signed into law a bill 
banning the teaching of evolution in Tennessee.20  He did so despite 
the protests of “liberal clergy and scientists from Tennessee and across 
America”21 in order to reinvigorate “old-fashioned faith and belief in the 
Bible.”22  Shortly after that, the American Civil Liberties Union began 
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found John Scopes, a Dayton, Tennessee biology teacher using a textbook 
that “prominently featured evolution.”23  Scopes was charged under the 
law and William Jennings Bryan, the former presidential candidate and 
attorney, was named special prosecutor.  He promised “a battle royal 
between the Christian people of Tennessee and the so-called scientists.”24  
Clarence Darrow, one of the most prominent defence attorneys in the 
United States at the time, took the case on behalf of the defendant.
In a series of events made legendary by the play and film Inherit the 
Wind, Darrow actually called Bryan to the stand as a self-proclaimed 
expert on the Bible.  This is despite the fact that there were no expert 
witnesses allowed on the evolutionary side.25  Darrow examined Bryan 
on such topics as “how Joshua lengthened the day by making the sun 
(rather than the Earth) stand still” and “how the snake that tempted 
Eve moved before God made it crawl on its belly,”26 demonstrating some 
of the scientific inconsistencies in the biblical account of creation.  It 
was all for  naught, however, as Scopes was convicted and the law 
upheld.  It was further upheld at appeal, although Scopes was acquitted 
on a technicality.  The result of this acquittal was that there could be 
no appeal to the Supreme Court, and the law remained on the books in 
Tennessee.27
The aftermath of the Scopes trial produced a flurry of activity: “Dozens of 
evangelical leaders rushed to pick up the fallen mantle, loosing a frenzy 
of uncoordinated and often localized legal activity against evolution.”28  
At the same time, 18 anti-evolutionary statutes were introduced in 15 
states.  Only Mississippi and Arkansas actually passed these acts, and in 
Arkansas it was the result of a public initiative.29  From 1925 until 1967, it 
was illegal to teach evolution in those states, although the law was rarely 
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themselves and made attempts to ban evolutionary teaching.30 
In 1968 the Supreme Court released its decision in Epperson v. Arkansas.31  
Ms. Epperson was an Arkansas public school teacher seeking a declaration 
that the Arkansas anti-evolution statute was unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.  The court traced the origins and purpose of the law, 
and the question was decided based on the purpose and primary effects of 
the legislation in question.  It found:
There can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to 
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of 
evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some 
that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source 
of doctrine as to the origin of man…its antecedent, 
Tennessee’s “monkey law” [discussed in the Scopes case] 
candidly stated its purpose: to make it unlawful ‘to teach 
any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of 
man as taught in the Bible.’32
The decision is brief but the effect was profound: it was no longer legal to 
ban the teaching of evolution in American classrooms.  Equally interesting 
is the dissent of Justice Black, who would have struck the law for vagueness 
as opposed to violating the Establishment Clause.  He introduces a theme 
that would play a prominent role in the legal reasoning of creationists: 
“whether this Court’s decision forbidding a State to exclude the subject of 
evolution from its schools infringes the religious freedom of those who 
consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine.”33  This idea of evolution as 
anti-religious and therefore equally abhorrent to the Establishment Clause 
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B. 1968-1987: The Balancing Phase
The overturning of the ban led to a new strategy on the part of creationists 
– where evolution is taught, some form of creationism must be as well.  
This new phase began in 1973 in Tennessee, with the introduction of a 
bill requiring equal space in biology textbooks be given to creationism.34  
This was the new approach that was later mirrored in Texas, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and several other states.  However, this approach was struck 
down when challenged.  As early as 1975 the Tennessee law was challenged 
in Daniel v. Waters35 where Epperson is quoted extensively and the court 
notes that:
The result of this legislation is a clearly defined 
preferential position for the Biblical version of creation 
as opposed to any account of the development of man 
based on scientific research and reasoning.  For a state 
to seek to enforce such a preference by law is to seek to 
accomplish the very establishment of religion which the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
squarely forbids.36
This did not deter many supporters of the balanced approach, many of 
whom “interpreted the blanket Daniel condemnation as merely identifying 
a couple of technical problems with the law.”37 The Daniel decision is 
also notable in that the court applied the new test for an Establishment 
violation arising from Lemon v. Kurtzman (hereafter “the Lemon Test”) to 
the issue of creationism being taught.  This test will be discussed in detail 
below.
The Daniel decision was not a Supreme Court decision, but it did guide 
the actions of courts in other jurisdictions.  In 1982, Judge Overton of 
the U.S. District Court in Arkansas released his decision in McLean v. 
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in Daniel, only by this point creationism had been re-branded “creation-
science.”  The decision was notable for several reasons.  For one, it traces 
the origins of the “balanced approach” laws from their origins in the 
Christian fundamentalist movement.  The Act in question was the result of 
the actions of one fervent individual whose religious motivations are well 
documented.
The most important part of McLean is the direct challenge it issues to the 
scientific credibility of creationist theory.  The requirement of teaching 
creation-science alongside evolution “lacks legitimate educational value 
because ‘creation-science’ as defined in that section is simply not science.”39  
Judge Overton creates a list of the essential characteristics of science, which 
are
(1) It is guided by natural law; 
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; 
(3) It is testable against the empirical world; 
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the    
      final word, and; 
(5) It is falsifiable.40
He then applies these criteria to the creation-science advocated by the 
state, noting that it “not only fails to follow the canons of dealing with 
scientific theory, it also fails to fit the more general descriptions of ‘what 
scientists think’ or ‘what scientists do.’”41  Judge Overton found the 
balanced treatment unconstitutional because of its religious purpose, as in 
Daniel, but he also continued his analysis into the effects of the legislation, 
the second prong of the Lemon Test.42
The final word on the balancing approach of creation advocates came 
from the United States Supreme Court in a 1987 case called Edwards v. 
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court ruled against this approach based, once again, on the purpose prong 
of the Lemon Test.  The court found that the “preeminent purpose of the 
Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that 
a supernatural being created humankind.”44  The dissent by Justice Scalia 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this prong of the test altogether, 
saying that a statute’s effects are the only aspect worth examining.  Justice 
O’Connor concurred along with Justice Powell, advocating a use of the 
Endorsement Test instead of the Lemon Test.
Regardless of the test used, Edwards was the final word on the teaching of 
creationism in American schools, but the debate was not over.  Creationists 
once again adjusted their strategy and began championing “intelligent 
design” instead of biblical creation as the alternative to evolution that 
should be taught in schools.
C. 1988-present: The Intelligent Design Phase
Many of the intellectual origins of the intelligent design movement can 
be traced to some of Justice Scalia’s comments in the Edwards dissent.  He 
wrote that Christian students “are quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have 
whatever scientific evidence there may be against evolution presented in their 
schools.”45  As Time magazine notes, “That line of argument – an emphasis 
on weaknesses and gaps in evolution – is at the heart of the intelligent design 
movement, which has as its motto ‘Teach the Controversy.’”46  The intelligent 
design movement, spearheaded by the Discovery Institute mentioned above, 
created a legal strategy for debunking evolution and replacing it with “the 
theistic understanding that nature and human beings are created by God”47 
and doing it through “scientific” means.
The current question for those following this debate is whether or not 
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for the intelligent design movement as it appears to be.  This case will be 
discussed in detail below.
Ironically, the evidence indicates that the formal elements of the intelligent 
design movement attempted to distance themselves from the individuals in 
Dover, feeling that because of comments like William Buckingham’s “two 
thousand years ago, someone died on a cross.  Can’t someone take a stand 
for him?”48 might go against them during an analysis of whether or not 
there was a religious purpose.49
Indeed, the religiosity of the Board members in Dover played a large role 
in Judge Jones’ decision.  He noted that in Board meetings “several Dover 
School Board members advocated for the [intelligent design disclaimer] in 
expressly religious terms…[and] at least two Board members…defended the 
proposed curriculum change in the media in expressly religious terms.”50  The 
intelligent design disclaimer was found unconstitutional based on essentially 
all aspects of the Lemon Test as well as the Endorsement Test.
III. ISSUES IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Lemon Test
Despite the dominance of the Lemon Test in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence for some time, several aspects of it remain controversial and 
difficult to apply in practice.  These issues will be discussed below in the 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman51 was decided in 1971, and is a case about government 
funding of non-public religious schools.  Chief Justice Burger wrote that 
a piece of legislation challenged under the Establishment Clause must 
pass three tests:  “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion …finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”52  Essentially, religious purpose, 
religious effect (that establishes or endorses a religion), or religious 
entanglement will invalidate a statute.
Judge Overton provides a good discussion of the values underlying the 
Establishment Clause in McLean.  He notes that it is meant to protect two 
values central to the Constitution, namely “voluntarism and pluralism.” 
He goes on to state that it is in the context of the public school system that 
“these values must be guarded most vigilantly.”53 He traces the evolution of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its continuing focus on keeping 
public schools free from “irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, or 
religion…however subtly exercised.”54  Even before the Lemon Test was 
articulated, the purpose of a particular statute was a central concern of 
judges.  In 1963, writing in Abbington School District v. Schempp (quoted 
in McLean), Justice Clark stated that “to withstand the structures of the 
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”55
While this approach to the Establishment Clause was not explicitly set out 
until Lemon, similar reasoning can be seen in earlier cases. With respect 
to creationism being taught in the classroom the test is the same.  In 
Epperson, the case mentioned above that struck down an anti-evolution 
statute in Arkansas based on the religious purposes of those who advocated 
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There can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to 
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of 
evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some 
that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source 
of doctrine as to the origin of man.  No suggestion 
has been made that Arkansas’ law may be justified by 
considerations of state policy other than the religious 
views of some of its citizens.56
However, despite the persistence of the Lemon Test as a guiding principle 
in Establishment Clause interpretation, things may be changing.  The law is 
unsettled. As of this writing there is no consensus as to how it will develop 
in the future.  Indeed, one writer notes that “the Court and commentators 
alike acknowledge that while Lemon no longer has the full support of 
a majority of the Court, Lemon’s ideological successor has yet to be 
anointed.”57  Despite the suspected decline in the importance of Lemon, its 





    Arkansas, the case in which anti-evolution statutes were 
ruled unconstitutional, was the first Establishment Clause case to rely 
on the purpose of the legislation in overruling it.58  In that case, the 
Court could have easily ruled the statute void for vagueness (as the three 
separate concurring opinions state),59 but Justice Fortas chose instead to 
rely on the statute’s invalid purpose to declare it null and void.  What he 
does not specify and what will be a major issue in determining future 
creationist cases is whose purpose is being examined.  This has repeatedly 
posed problems in the application of the purpose analysis, and begs the 
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In Epperson, the invalid purpose is attributed simply to “Arkansas.”  
Justice Fortas does not specify whether it is individual legislators, the 
state government, school boards, et cetera, whose purposes are being 
examined.  No guidance is provided to future courts as to how to interpret 
purpose.  While the Lemon Test incorporates it into Establishment Clause 
jurisdiction, it is not made clear whose purpose is to be examined.  The 
use of the state name seems to indicate that some sort of governmental 
purpose will be looked at.
This is not the route taken by the court in McLean, however.  In McLean, 
the main actor whose purpose is examined is a gentleman named Paul 
Ellwanger, “a respiratory therapist who is trained in neither law nor 
science,” who formed an organization called “Citizens for Fairness in 
Education.”60  The court examines in detail Mr. Ellwanger’s personal 
beliefs and correspondence.  It cites letters to pastors and state senators, 
as well as private citizens.61  Mr. Ellwanger was one of the main driving 
forces behind the legislation being challenged, but he was a private citizen 
rallying support for a cause he believes in.  In one letter to Senator Bill 
Keith (a Louisiana state senator and not at all involved in the passing of the 
Arkansas legislation being challenged), Mr. Ellwanger writes  
I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-
God forces, though I know there are a large number of 
evolutionists who believe in God…it behooves Satan to 
do all he can to thwart our efforts and confuse the issue 
at every turn…If you have a clear choice between having 
grassroots leaders of this statewide bill promotion effort 
to be ministerial or non-ministerial, be sure to opt for the 
non-ministerial.  It does the bill effort no good to have 
ministers out there in the public forum.62
While the correspondence clearly demonstrates that there are religious 
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to the analysis, it is unclear from the purpose-driven decision in Epperson 
that it is the purposes of private individuals and organizations that 
is being questioned.  There are no requirements, legal or otherwise, 
that advocates of government action cannot have religious purposes. 
The actual sponsor of the bill, State Senator James L. Holsted, receives 
only two paragraphs (compared to eleven about Mr. Ellwanger) in the 
McLean judgment, where he is described as a “‘born again’ Christian 
fundamentalist.”63  No doubt Mr. Ellwanger’s correspondence with him 
is relevant, but it is unclear how the purposes of one private individual, 
however supportive he may be, are relevant to the constitutional analysis 
of a piece of legislation.  
While there is certainly a nexus of interest between the citizens who 
lobby for particular legislative action and legislators who implement it, 
it should not be the focus of the analysis.  McLean, while not a Supreme 
Court decision, is nevertheless important in that statutory purpose used to 
invalidate an anti-evolution statute, yet, it is problematic because the wrong 
party’s purpose was analyzed. 
Edwards is the Supreme Court’s final word on the requirement that 
creationism be taught alongside evolution, and the Supreme Court 
provides some guidance as to what is meant by “purpose.”  
A governmental intention to promote religion is clear 
when the State enacts a law to serve a religious purpose.  
This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion 
in general…or by advancement of a particular religious 
belief.64
In Edwards, the law in question had as its stated purpose “academic 
freedom,”65 but the Supreme Court rightly looks past this.  It points out 
that requiring teachers to teach both evolution and creation or neither is, 
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academic freedom as its goal, it “does not further this purpose.”66  The 
main concept coming out of the court’s “purpose” analysis in Edwards is 
the oft-quoted phrase, “While the Court is normally deferential to a State’s 
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such 
a purpose…be sincere and not a sham.”67  Here, it examines the legislative 
history, particularly that involving Senator Bill Keith (the same Bill Keith 
who was corresponding with McLean’s Mr. Ellwanger) and determines that 
the goal of the act was not, in fact, the promotion of academic freedom.  It 
quotes Senator Keith as saying he does not believe in evolution because it 
promotes views “contrary to his own religious beliefs” and consonant with 
what he refers to as “aetheistism  [sic.]”68
This approach seems more consistent with the idea of legislative purpose 
than the one used in McLean.  The only actors analyzed are the state 
legislators, and the purpose of the Act in question is measured not against 
the mission statement of a lobbying organization, but against the stated 
goals of the Act in question.  In particular, the phrase “not a sham” gives 
lower courts an opportunity to look behind the stated purpose, although 
the court makes it clear that some deference should be given to the stated 
purpose.  What is not clear is how much deference.  Is the discussion 
of citizen lobbyists appropriate, as was done in McLean?  Certainly the 
analysis in Edwards does go beyond the actual purposes of government 
actors, including
the legislative history and historical context of the Act, 
the specific sequence of events leading to the passage of 
the Act, the State Board’s report on a survey of school 
superintendents, and the correspondence between the 
Act’s legislative sponsor and its key witnesses.69
The Supreme Court seems content in Edwards with limiting the analysis 
to governmental purposes but lowering the amount of deference given to 
specific claims.  This is certainly a better approach than the one taken in 
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McLean, where a law can be invalidated based on the purposes of the non-
governmental individuals and groups who support it.
An approach similar to the one outlined in Edwards is used by Judge 
Jones in Kitzmiller.  There he notes that, “the purpose inquiry involves 
consideration of the ID Policy’s language, ‘enlightened by its context and 
contemporaneous legislative history,’ including, in this case, the broader 
context of historical and ongoing religiously driven attempts to advance 
creationism while denigrating evolution.”70  The facts of that case make 
the purpose analysis easy: the school board members made numerous 
statements about their religious views being reflected in the school 
curriculum.  The simplicity of the analysis, while easy in the sense that 
the school board members had made numerous statements, still does 
betray confusion around whose purpose should be analyzed.  Judge Jones 
does place some importance on the position of “the intelligent design 
movement” in the form of the Discovery Institute, even though it claims to 
have washed its hands of the Dover School Board.71
While the move from the all-encompassing purpose analysis in McLean 
to a limited focus on the purpose of government actors in Edwards and 
Kitzmiller is a positive development, there are still serious flaws with a 
purpose driven approach to Establishment Clause issues.
The first comes from the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia in Edwards, where they try to distinguish “purpose” in a legal sense 
from “motivation.”  They note that
Notwithstanding the majority’s implication to the 
contrary…we do not presume that a law’s purpose is 
to advance religion merely because it was supported 
strongly by organized religions or by adherents of 
particular faiths…To do so would deprive religious men 
and women of their right to participate in the political 
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process.  Today’s religious activism may give us the [Act 
in question], but yesterday’s resulted in the abolition 
of slavery and tomorrow’s may bring relief for famine 
victims.72
Their point is valid and similar to the one made above in the discussion of 
McLean.  Overtly religious statements by legislators and state actors will 
normally be caught in the purpose analysis, but the dissent in Edwards 
rightly points out that religious motivations of individual citizens should 
not play a role.  It effectively separates the religious purpose of a piece 
of legislation from the religious motivations of private individuals who 
support it.  However, given the fact that it was Justices Scalia and Rehnquist 
who were making this argument in Edwards, it is unclear whether or not 
they would agree with the statement above.  They were likely trying to 
remove even the motivations of legislators from the analysis.  Indeed, they 
later note that “determining the subjective intent of legislators is a perilous 
enterprise.”73
Attempts to mitigate the peril of this “enterprise” have begun in recent 
years.  In some cases, the court has stopped looking for the actual purpose 
of the actors and started looking at what the “reasonable observer” would 
construe this purpose to be.  This approach has yet to be applied to any 
case dealing with the teaching of creationism, but it has been applied to 
other Establishment Clause cases.  But, as one writer notes, 
Given the constantly changing nature of Establishment 
Clause doctrine, it is unclear whether this newly 
expanded role of the reasonable observer is a definitive 
change or merely a temporary shift.74
Whether a permanent development or a temporary shift, this is obviously 
a problematic method of analysis.  First, it is not clear why the reasonable 
observer’s impressions of a law’s purpose are more important than the 
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argument that the reasonable observer might not actually appreciate 
the true purpose, forcing the court to impose its own judgment anyway.  
Finally, a reasonable observer of a law’s purpose should be expected to 
understand a great deal more about contextual factors than a reasonable 
observer of the text alone.  These three problems are summed up well by 
Kristi Bowman, when she states, “Importing the reasonable observer into 
the government purpose analysis affects the analysis of both issues of law 
and issues of fact in peculiar ways, making the government observer ever 
more a fiction in the colloquial sense of the word.”75
Purpose, then, has been narrowed from a broad analysis of the social 
activist motivations behind a piece of legislation, as in Epperson, to 
an analysis of government actors’ stated purpose, to an analysis of the 
reasonable observer.  It is interesting that in general Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, the purpose aspect of the Test is rarely relied upon.  
Conversely, in the context of teaching creationism, purpose is the aspect 
of the Test used most frequently.76  Whether this speaks to the difficulty of 
analyzing the religious effects of creationist strategies or the often blatant 
disregard for the Establishment Clause shown by the sponsors of the 
creationist laws is unclear.  What is clear is that purpose lacks clarity and 
should be phased out altogether as a point of analysis.  It is overbroad and 
vague and attempts to augment it by importing a reasonable observer suffer 
drawbacks all their own.  The flaws with the purpose analysis demonstrate 
that if legislation cannot be invalidated because of its effects, perhaps it 
should not be invalidated at all.
2. Effect and the Scientific Inquiry
The second part of the Lemon Test asks the effect of the impugned law.  
If its effect is primarily religious, the law cannot stand.  If the effect is 
primarily secular and has a secondary religious effect, the law is valid.  The 
Supreme Court has provided some guidance with respect to this prong of 
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The core notion animating the requirement that…[an 
official act’s] ‘principal or primary effect…be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion,’ is not only that 
government may not be overtly hostile to religion but 
also that it may not place its prestige, coercive authority, 
or resources behind a single religious faith or behind 
religious belief in general, compelling non-adherents to 
support the practices or proselytizing of favored religious 
organizations and conveying the message that those who 
do not contribute gladly are less than full members of the 
community.77
The effect test is fairly straightforward, and the only confusion arising from 
it is in its relationship with the Endorsement Test.  The Endorsement Test is 
treated as a separate test from the Lemon Test, although it is in many ways 
simply the effect analysis.  This will be discussed below.
The effect prong is rarely used in the creationism jurisprudence for the 
simple reason, mentioned above, that most courts have usually managed 
to invalidate statutes based on their religious purpose.  In Edwards, the 
statute is invalidated based on its purpose but the court does provide a very 
basic analysis of the effects.  In its purpose analysis, it notes that one of 
the effects is “either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public 
school classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects 
evolution in its entirety.”78
In the context of creationism in the classroom, one of the main points of 
contention can be drawn from the statement quoted above and logical 
deduction – if creationism and intelligent design are religious theories, 
then they will have religious effects.  If they are not religious, then they will 
not have religious effects.  Creationists are faced with a difficult position: 
they maintain that creationism and intelligent design are science, but that 
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points out the ramifications of this logic and the reasons creationists are so 
loath to accept scientific scrutiny: “since [intelligent design] is not science, 
the conclusion is inescapable that the only real effect of the [intelligent 
design policy] is the advancement of religion.”79  McLean makes a similar 
point, noting that “the conclusion that creation science has no scientific 
merit or educational value as science has legal significance in light of the 
Court’s previous conclusion that creation science has, as one major effect, 
the advancement of religion.”80
As stated, proponents of creationism and intelligent design vehemently 
reject the characterization of their respective viewpoints as religious as 
opposed to scientific, while also arguing that it is not the role of the courts 
to decide what is and what is not science.  Although most cases in the 
realm of creationism have relied upon a purpose analysis, the chaotic state 
and limited utility of the purpose analysis suggests a need to shift toward 
an effects-based approach.  Indeed, the purpose prong of the Lemon Test 
has become so convoluted that it is arguably unfair to force government 
actors to do anything other than assert a purpose and defend its effects 
as secular.  As in other areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
effect prong of the Lemon Test should be the workhorse.  In the context of 
science class, a secular effect requires scientific content.  This section will 
examine first the propriety of the court making scientific determinations, 
followed by a discussion of creation-science and intelligent design’s claims 
to scientific legitimacy and the courts’ response.
A great deal has been written by both sides of the debate on whether it 
is the role of courts to adjudicate what is and is not science.  Kitzmiller is 
the most recent decision, but as early as McLean the court was willing to 
decide what is and is not science.  In a critique of the Kitzmiller decision, 
De Wolfe, West and Luskin of the Discovery Institute note:
All that was necessary to determine that an Establishment 
Clause violation had occurred was to find that the Dover 
school board members had predominantly religious 
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motivations for enacting their [intelligent design policy].  
Longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests that 
in resolving constitutional issues, a narrow holding…is 
preferable to a broad holding (concerning the definition 
of science…or whether intelligent design is science).81
To bolster their point, the authors note that in previous decisions such as 
Edwards the court stopped short of an effect analysis and stayed out of 
the debate as to what is and is not science.82  On its face, the argument is 
valid.  Gradual change is better than sudden change and is more likely to 
produce good law without creating general constitutional rules out of very 
specific circumstances.  The critique above, however, is self-serving.  Of 
course proponents of intelligent design want the bulk of the analysis done 
at the purpose stage.  It is much easier to conceal the religious purpose of 
teaching intelligent design than to conceal the religious effect of teaching 
an unscientific theory in a science class.  
That said, those who criticize the court’s decision to analyze the science 
have little understanding of the effects prong of the Lemon Test.  If a 
curriculum change is created by a school board and triggers a suit under 
the Establishment Clause and no religious purpose can be found, it is 
necessary to turn to religious effects.  Whether or not a curriculum change 
has religious effects can only be discovered by examining the content 
of that curriculum and the context in which it is taught.  Therefore, 
analyzing the effect of a requirement that children be read a disclaimer 
about intelligent design before learning about evolution in science class 
requires an analysis of intelligent design.  Put in a different way, “teaching 
something other than science in the science classroom is suspect…in 
this context, it is essential to understand what constitutes science and the 
scientific method.”83  This intuitive point was either missed or ignored by 
those who criticized Judge Jones’ choice to analyze the scientific merit of 
intelligent design in Kitzmiller.












Creationism and Intelligent Design82 2009
Judge Jones also has legal precedent for his decision.  While the effects 
prong has been largely (and problematically) unnecessary for adjudication 
of the creationism debate, it was used in McLean.  In that case, the 
court actually laid out a five-part definition of what constitutes science 
before ruling that creation-science, despite its name, does not meet the 
definition.84  Despite the protestations of the intelligent design movement, 
defining science is absolutely a necessary part of the effects analysis of the 
Lemon Test in this context. Creationists likely appreciate this necessity and 
are simply engaging in legal maneuvering.  The argument that the court 
has no role in this discussion really is secondary to their argument that 
creationism and intelligent design are, in fact, scientific theories and belong 
alongside evolution in science classes.
Judge Jones found unequivocally that intelligent design “is not a new 
scientific argument, but is rather an old religious argument for the 
existence of God.”85  This mirrors the findings of McLean that “creation 
science ‘is simply not science’ because it depends on ‘supernatural 
intervention,’ which cannot be explained by natural causes or be proven 
through empirical investigation, and is therefore neither testable nor 
falsifiable.”86  It does not take a scientist (and indeed, this author is not 
one) to realize that “gaps” in evolutionary theory are not prima facie 
evidence of any other theory. They are simply gaps in the theory that 
cannot yet be explained by science.  In other words, “the main strategy of 
creation propagandists is the negative one of seeking out gaps in scientific 
knowledge and claiming to fill them with ‘intelligent design’ by default.”87  
In Kitzmiller, one witness noted that “absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence,”88 and another noted that “just because scientists cannot explain 
every evolutionary detail does not undermine its validity as a scientific 
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The centerpiece of intelligent design’s scientific aspirations is the concept of 
“irreducible complexity,” which is simply an example of the negative arguments 
described above.  If there are no scientific explanations for the irreducible 
complexity of systems like the bacterial flagellum or blood clotting (although 
intelligent design advocates were likely disappointed when Judge Jones 
explained that there are), it is simply because they have not been discovered 
yet.  One writer notes that “the speedy resort to a dramatic proclamation of 
irreducible complexity represents a failure of the imagination.”90  
Despite the arguments presented above and the temptation to provide 
more, it is beyond the scope of this paper to wade into the many reasons 
intelligent design and creationism are not science.  What is important to 
note is that the question is one that must be addressed by the courts when 
analyzing the effect of teaching creationism or intelligent design.  The legal 
future of creationism in American classrooms depends on demonstrating 
that it is scientific and not religious.  This is an uphill battle, to be sure.
The courts are correct to tackle this issue for one main reason – to 
determine whether or not the curriculum change has a religious effect, one 
must examine the content of that change.  Whether or not a curriculum 
is scientific or religious is best analyzed through the lens of its effect.  If it 
is demonstrably scientific and credible, and has some support within the 
scientific community then it should absolutely be a part of the curriculum, 
regardless of the motivations of those who placed it there.  If a significant 
number of credible studies demonstrate that not coveting thy neighbour 
lowers the cancer rate, there is no doubt that there would be religious 
support for teaching that and it would undoubtedly have a secondary 
religious purpose, but the primary effect of legislation requiring teachers 
to include it in the curriculum would be to lower the cancer rate.  Children 
should be taught credible, demonstrable, accepted science, regardless of 
the implications of that science.  If that leads to a decline in “old-fashioned 
faith and belief in the Bible,”91 then that is an unfortunate secondary effect 









Creationism and Intelligent Design84 2009
The purpose test is too flawed to be of significant assistance, despite the fact 
that it has been the workhorse of creationist jurisprudence.  It is the effect 
aspect of the Lemon Test that has the potential to properly assess proposed 
curriculum changes.  If creationists can demonstrate that teaching their 
version of history does not have the primary effect of advancing religion 
then they should be more than welcome to teach it.
B. The Endorsement Test
The Endorsement Test is an alternative to the Lemon Test, and the 
jurisprudential landscape is in such disarray that counsel tend to argue, 
and lower court judges apply, both tests.92  The Endorsement Test was 
created 1984 in Lynch v. Donnelly.93  What is notable about the early 
iterations of the Endorsement Test is that its distinction from the Lemon 
Test is unclear.  As Judge Jones notes in Kitzmiller, “it is now primarily a 
lens through which to view ‘effect,’ with purpose evidence being relevant 
to the inquiry derivatively.”94  Considering its relation to the effect element 
of the Lemon Test, the same issues surrounding scientific debates apply.  
The Endorsement Test adds a second layer, however, in that its focus is not 
so much on the actual effect of the policy but the effect perceived by the 
ubiquitous reasonable observer.
In Kitzmiller, the “reasonable observer” (renamed the “objective observer”) 
was divided in two parts and the perspectives of both the students in the 
school and the adults in the community were analyzed.95  This was necessary 
given some of the facts in Kitzmiller, including the communications between 
Board and the community at large, but of course suffers from the same 
drawback discussed above when the reasonable observer is imported in to 
the purpose analysis, namely, the importance of actual effect versus perceived 
effect, the ability of individuals to conceal effects, and the ever-growing body 
of knowledge that must be attributed to reasonable observers.96  
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Justice O’Connor’s focus on the perceived effect does have the advantage of 
protecting the possible alienation of individuals who are outside whatever 
religion is being promoted in violation of the Establishment Clause.  It 
does this by invalidating laws based on the effect they have on individuals, 
particularly individuals who might not share the beliefs of the majority.  In 
Lynch she writes
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.97
The application of this to the teaching of creationism is obvious.  Students 
who do not adhere to the story of creation found in the Book of Genesis 
would most certainly feel that they are outsiders.  This effect is magnified 
when it is recalled that the individuals in question are children who are 
being taught biblical stories as science.  It could be argued that bible 
literalists could feel alienated by the teaching of only evolution, but the 
salient difference is that one is science and the other is religion. The 
main focus of the Endorsement Test is those individuals alienated by the 
endorsement of religious ideas, not those alienated by secular ones. Science 
that affects religious beliefs is perfectly legal.  Intelligent design does not 
fare much better under this test. As Judge Jones notes, since a reasonable 
objective observer would be familiar with the history of the intelligent 
design movement (recall the impressive array of knowledge possessed by 
Establishment Clause reasonable observers) and would know that it is 
essentially creationism in disguise,98 the reasonable observer who did not 
believe in creationism would feel alienated.
The relationship of the Endorsement Test to the Lemon Test is uncertain.  It 
seems to be an attempt to move the effect branch of the Lemon Test away 
from an analysis of the actual effect of government action and towards the 
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alienation felt by individuals excluded from the endorsed religion will 
surely be one of an action’s actual effects and will be caught by that prong 
of the Lemon Test.  By limiting the scope of the analysis to perceived effects 
only, the Endorsement Test limits the efficacy of the inquiry.  The court has 
compensated for this by endowing the objective observer with a great deal 
of knowledge and background information, but as has been noted, this 
makes the objective observer “ever more a fiction.”99
The purpose prong of the Lemon Test is over-inclusive, and and attempts to 
change it have resulted in interpretations that are incorrect and overbroad.  
The Endorsement Test’s focus on perceived instead of actual effects seems 
unnecessary.  The proper test is simply the effect prong of the Lemon Test.  
Strangely, in all other Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a statute’s actual 
effect is the most common way to invalidate it.  It is only in the context 
of teaching creationism that the purpose aspect of the analysis has been 
used, and Edwards is “one of only five Supreme Court cases in which an 
impermissible government purpose invalidated the state statute at issue.”100  
A statute’s effect is the most important element of the analysis and if a 
government action cannot be invalidated based on its effect, perhaps it 
should not be invalidated at all.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE DEBATE
Despite this author’s firm belief that the effect aspect of the test is all 
that is necessary, no consensus has been reached on how to deal with 
Establishment Clause cases, particularly those dealing with the teaching of 
creationism.  There is real need for clarity, as the debate surrounding what 
can and cannot be taught to American children is far from over.  According 
to Time magazine, 55% of Americans think some form of creationism 
should be taught and 45% of that believes in 6-day creationism as 
99  Ibid.
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described in the Bible.  The most troubling figure is that 54% of Americans 
do not think they are the product of evolution.101  Whether this represents 
a failure of science education or the success of religious fundamentalism is 
unknown.  The Kitzmiller decision was a setback for the intelligent design 
movement and its desire to “disclaim” legitimate science with religious 
beliefs, but it was not a killing blow in the way that Epperson was for anti-
evolution statutes or Edwards for balance requirements. 
Indeed, there is a great deal of debate over whether Kitzmiller spelled 
the end of the intelligent design movement and the disclaimer approach 
to evolution.  Legally, the debate is far from over.  Despite its sweeping 
thoroughness, Judge Jones’ decision has no precedential value outside 
of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The decision was not appealed 
because the Board of Directors being sued was replaced by the angry 
citizens of Dover in the ensuing school board elections.  The decision 
stands as an excellent example of judicial reasoning, but unfortunately has 
no legal value beyond just that.  The decision is just an example.
As for the intelligent design movement, while legally it may live to fight 
another day it is suffering from a credibility deficit that will be difficult 
to overcome, primarily due to the public perception of the individuals 
responsible for the situation in Dover.  Time’s poll may have indicated 
that Americans are in favour of some sort of religion being taught in their 
schools, but the attitudes of the school board members who made it so 
in Dover certainly raised eyebrows.  This is ironic, because the organized 
elements of this movement seem to have taken steps to distance themselves 
from the individuals in Dover, described by one writer as occurring when
An auto repairman appointed an OxyContin-addicted 
biblical literalist without a shred of knowledge to decide 
which books the kids should learn from, and a woman 
who had no curiosity about anything, even her own most 
deeply held beliefs, seconded the whole idea.102































Creationism and Intelligent Design88 2009
A harsh analysis perhaps, but true.  And it certainly demonstrates why 
the Discovery Institute attempted to distance itself from its test case,  why 
future school boards might think twice before advocating any sort of 
religious curriculum change, and why Americans might be hesitant to let 
them.  In winter of 2007, the Montana Law Review released a special issue 
devoted to the issues in Kitzmiller, including a lengthy treatise entitled, 
“Intelligent Design Will Survive Dover.”  In it, the authors (who are 
affiliated with the Discovery Institute) spend a great deal of time trying to 
separate the intelligent design movement from the actions of the Dover 
school board.103  Factually, the Discovery Institute seems to have distanced 
themselves from the individuals in Dover, but that does not change the fact 
that it was intelligent design, not the intelligent design movement, which 
was on trial.  
The bulk of the article is spent re-debating whether or not intelligent 
design is science.  Realistically, this is the last hope of the intelligent design 
movement.  Its relationship with creationism and the usually overtly 
religious motives of its supporters will make passing future iterations 
of the purpose prong of the test difficult.  If it is scientific, however, its 
effects cannot be any more or less religious than the effects of teaching 
other science, even if that science does have a secondary effect on 
religious beliefs.  Evolution is an example of this.  Indeed, it is a constantly 
rejected argument of the creationist movement that evolution violates 
the Establishment Clause by being “anti-religious.”  Unfortunately for 
intelligent design proponents, their science seems to boil down to the 
simple philosophy that “if you don’t understand how something works, 
never mind: just give up and say God did it.”104  Intelligent design is no 
more science than creation-science is, and its main pursuit is not the search 
of evidence to bolster its position, but the search for gaps that could raise 
doubt about evolutionary theory.  Intelligent design is not science, it is an 
attempt to discredit science.  Indeed, the fact that the creationist textbook 
that was at issue in Kitzmiller had the word “creationism” replaced with 
the words “intelligent design” is particularly telling.105  Without further 

















Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 89Vol. 18
scientific evidence of the legitimacy of their position, it is difficult to see 
any court case on the subject escaping the effects prong of the test and 
ending differently than it did in Kitzmiller.
V. CONCLUSION: THE AMERICAN WAY
As stated above, 54% of Americans think they are not the product 
of evolution.106  All this number makes clear is that the issue has not 
died down.  Despite the unlikelihood of legal success and the blatant 
unconstitutionality of teaching creationism or disclaiming evolution, 
the issue is as much one of faith as it is law.  The interpretations of the 
constitution in cases from Epperson to Kitzmiller are no doubt correct, 
but how can they be justified to a population so clearly in thrall to anti-
scientific religious theories? The answer is in the beautiful simplicity of 
the Establishment Clause that allows judges to maintain their personal 
religious beliefs while banning those beliefs from science classes.  The 54% 
cited above may be a sad statistic indicative of a broken school system or 
a positive development and a testament to the enduring power of people’s 
faith, but it points at a constitution that is maintaining one of its core tenets 
in the face of an incredibly divisive issue.
Epperson made it unconstitutional to ban teaching evolution.  McLean 
and Edwards made it unconstitutional to require teaching creationism 
alongside it, and Kitzmiller made it unconstitutional to disclaim evolution 
with unscientific theories.  These decisions were made using different 
elements of different legal tests.  The purpose prong of the Lemon Test 
has contracted and expanded, and the reasonable observer has made an 
appearance there as well as in the “effect” analysis.  The jurisprudence is 
muddled and insufficient emphasis is placed on a government action’s 
actual effect, but throughout it all the central principle that “Congress shall 
106  Time, supra	
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make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof ” has been held to mean that if it is not science, it cannot be 
taught in science class.    
In the current legal context, the future of creationism in public schools 
is murky, at best. As Chapman points out, “What natural selection will 
ultimately do with all of us remains to be seen, but in the Dover school 
board election that took place shortly after the trial, it eliminated nearly 
all those who supported intelligent design.”107  Bonsell and Buckingham, 
the gentlemen whose religious convictions began the latest round of 
this 80-year conflict in Dover were unceremoniously voted out.  The 
decision in Kitzmiller and the cases that preceded it represent a victory 
of constitutional principles over passionate and well-intentioned, but 
ultimately misguided, activism by individuals and legislators.  Perhaps 
Dover is a microcosm of the United States and perhaps not, but Kitzmiller 
and the decisions that came before it represent a victory of the separation 
of church and state over religious indoctrination in public schools, and the 
victory of scientific method over supernatural belief.
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